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UNIVERSALISM AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TODD B. ADAMs*
Several courts have recently rejected a "reasonable person" standard in
evaluating sexual harassment claims based on an abusive work environment.'
These courts primarily rejected the reasonable person standard because it
often resulted in a validation of a status quo work environment that was
harmful to women. 2 Implicit within their rejection of a reasonable person
standard is a rejection of the concept of universalism in evaluating sexual
harassment. Instead, these courts have adopted a reasonable victim standard,
which effectively divides the world into reasonable men and reasonable
women. Dividing the world into two different types of people does not
advance the goals that these courts had hoped to achieve. This article argues
that dividing the world into two different types of people is unnecessary
and unwise, because a carefully formulated reasonable person standard will
better advance justice for women and men.
4
Developing the Theoretical Basis for a Reasonable Victim Standard
The use of a reasonable victim standard was suggested in a note published
in 1984 in the Harvard Law Review (the Note).5 The courts and judges
* Assistant Attorney General, State of Michigan. J.D., 1984, University of Michigan;
B.A., 1978, Miami University. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author. I wish
to thank the many people who provided help and comments on this article, especially Thomas
Quasarano.
1. See King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir.
1990); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d
630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990);
Radtke v. Everitt, No. 121611, slip op. at 3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 20, 1991). Not all courts
have rejected the reasonable person standard. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (a fact finder should keep "both the man's and woman's
perspective in mind"); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
481 U.S. 1041 (1986) (adopting a reasonable person standard).
2. Rabidue is an example of a poor decision using a reasonable person standard. In
Rabidue, the court upheld the finding of the district court below that extremely vulgar,
demeaning, and sexual language towards women in general and the plaintiff in particular, even
when combined with the presence of posters of nude women in the workplace, did not create
an abusive work environment. The cases and the literature have rightly criticized the Rabidue
decision as insensitive to the experience of women and wrong. See, e.g., Davis v. Monsanto
Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989); Ehrenreich,
Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment
Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1193-214 (1990); Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experiences
vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 35, 62-68 (1990); Finley, A Break in the Silence:
Including Women's Issues in a Tort Course, 3 YALE J. L. & FEMiNisM 41, 58-61 (1990).
3. For purposes of this article, the term "universalism" means the legal philosophy that
a court can and should apply one standard of justice in deciding cases regardless of the race,
sex, or other immutable characteristic of the parties.
4. This is a limited argument. A reasonable victim standard is clearly better than a
reasonable person standard as applied in Rabidue.
5. Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1449 (1984).
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which have adopted a reasonable victim standard have generally followed
the suggestions set forth in the Note.
The Rabidue dissent provides the fullest explanation for adopting a
reasonable victim standard to evaluate sexual harassment claims by women.
A reasonable victim standard "simultaneously allows courts to consider
salient sociological differences as well as shield employers from the neurotic
complainant."
'7
The salient sociological difference referred to is that "many of the actions
women find offensive are perceived by men to be harmless and innocent. '"
The dissent continued, "[C]oncemn for the dignity of women would require
courts to determine the wrongfulness of conduct from the standpoint of the
victim: .hence continual minor humiliations as well as flagrant assaults would
become actionable." 9
The Rabidue dissent and the Note argue that the appropriate standard
must "account for the wide divergence between most women's views of
appropriate conduct and those of men."' 0 In particular, any standard must
not "lock[ ] the vast majority of women into workplaces which tolerate
anti-female behavior"" or force a woman, "simply because she is a woman,
to tolerate abusive conditions in order to earn a living."'
2
The Note added another reason to adopt a reasonable victim standard.
A reasonable victim standard would help bring about "a gradual internal-
ization of the legal norm" about appropriate standards of behavior in the
workplace which protect women from sexual harassment. 3
Many courts have followed this approach. In Yates v. Avco Corp. ,'4 the
court held that "it seems only reasonable that the person standing in the
shoes of the employee should be the 'reasonable woman' since plaintiff in
this type of case is required to be a member of a protected class and is by
definition female."s In a footnote, the Yates court, in dicta, adopted a
reasonable man standard in cases involving a male subordinate.' 6 In this
footnote, the court relied on the Rabidue dissent for the proposition "that
men and women are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different
behavior" as apparently a fuller explanation of why it adopted a reasonable
victim standard."r
6. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir.) (Keith, J., concurring and
dissenting), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1986).
7. Id. at 626 (Keith. J., concurring and dissenting) (citation omitted).
8. Id. at 1451 (footnote omitted) (the Rabidue dissent relied on the Note for this prop-
osition).
9. Id. at 1452.
10. Id. at 626 (Keith, J., concurring and dissenting); Note, supra note 5, at 1451.
11. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 627.
12. Note, supra note 5, at 1455-56.
13. Id. at 1451, 1458, 1459.
14. 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987).
15. Yates, 819 F.2d at 637.
16. Id. at 637 n.2.
17. Id.
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In Ellison v. Brady,"8 the court also adopted a reasonable victim stan-
dard. 19 Its rationale was that "[cionduct that many men consider unobjec-
tionable may offend many women." The court then proceeded to examine
the case law for support of this statement. 20 It held that a reasonable victim
standard was necessary "primarily because we believe that a sex-blind
reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systemat-
ically ignore the experiences of women." 2'
Some have argued that title VII requires adoption of a reasonable woman
standard. The Yates court's reasoning stated that the reasonable woman
standard should apply because "the plaintiff in this type of case is required
to be a member of a protected class and is by definition female." The
Ellison court emphasized that title VII was not "fault-based." ' 21 A law
review author has recently suggested that a reasonable person standard is
weak because title VII was designed "to reform society." 24
A Reasonable Victim Standard May Not Advance
the Goals It Intends to Advance
A reasonable victim standard is intended to improve opportunities for
women in the workplace and to create one standard in the workplace which
does not tolerate sexual harassment. These are important goals, but it is
important to examine critically whether a reasonable victim standard will
actually achieve these goals. This article argues that a reasonable victim
standard may actually be counterproductive.
The task of showing how a reasonable victim standard may work against
the very goals it intends to achieve is complicated because the courts have
interpreted the reasonable victim standard in two different ways. One in-
terpretation adopts a reasonable woman standard for all cases. The other
adopts a reasonable woman standard when the woman is the victim and a
reasonable man standard when the man is the victim.
The court in Yates adopted the reasonable woman standard where the
woman is the victim and a reasonable man standard where the man is the
victimY This approach is most problematical for the stated goals of in-
creasing opportunities for women, eliminating stereotypes, and creating a
new, harassment-free workplace norm.
Establishing two standards in sexual harassment cases, one for women
and one for men, is very similar to protective legislation for women.
18. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
19. Id. at 878.
20. Id. at 878-79.
21. Id. at 879.
22. Yates, 819 F.2d at 637 (footnote omitted).
23. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880. This reasoning shows some of the confusion in the courts
because one of the purposes of adopting a reasonable victim standard is to raise the con-
sciousness of men so that they know certain types of behavior are wrong.
24. Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1178.
25. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987).
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Protective legislation typically establishes a different standard for men and
a different standard for women for the stated reason of preventing the
exploitation of viomen.26 For example, a law may state that employers shall
not force women to work overtime, whereas the employer may force men
to work overtime.
27
The two standards in Yates established a sexual harassment policy which
was more protective of women than of men. The Yates court, when it
argued that "men and women are vulnerable in different ways and offended
by different behavior," was suggesting a false symmetry. It was false because
the Yates court, and the Rabidue dissent before it, rejected a standard for
women based on the "ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned
by the offenders, in this case, men" as unfair.28 Individual men, however,
will have their claims judged in accordance with some of these ingrained
notions.
Protective legislation has certain well-known negative effects which should
be carefully weighed before protective legislation is adopted. First, the
creation of two separate standards makes it more expensive to employ
women than men and discourages integration. An employer who manages
a segregated workplace 9 in an environment of sexually-oriented posters and
vulgar language will weigh the cost of employing a woman, including the
cost of eliminating the sexual posters and vulgar language from the work-
place, against the cost of a sexual harassment judgment. The cost of hiring
a man would not include these costs. Equal opportunity laws force an
employer not only to eliminate sexual posters and vulgar language, but also
to employ women; however, an employer may employ fewer women or only
women the employer believes will not be offended by the prevailing work-
place norm.
30
Two standards may also promote the very stereotypes which underlie and
support sexual harassment. Two standards suggest that women are the
"weaker sex" who need protection on the shop floor. Two standards suggest
that men are "animals" who cannot be expected to control their aggressive
and sexual urges in the workplace. 3'
26. Protective legislation for women was held constitutional in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S
412 (1908). It has been more carefully scrutinized recently. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
(1979).
27. This law discriminates against women because an employer who wants its employees
to work overtime in order to avoid paying fringe benefits will hire men. In order to hire
women the employer must hire extra workers and pay them fringe benefits.
28. Rabidue v. Oscecla Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 625 (6th Cir.) (Keith, J., concurring and
dissenting), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1986).
29. It is illegal for an employer to intentionally maintain a segregated workplace, but
segregated workplaces exist which are not necessarily illegal. Moreover, the question is the
practical effect of having two standards on the willingness of employers to employ women in
traditionally segregated workplaces.
30. For example, it can be argued that the Osceola Refining Company, in Rabidue, hired
and promoted Vivienne Rabidue because it believed her personality would allow her to survive
in its hostile workplace.
31. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STANFoRD L. REv. 617, 625 (1990) (where the
[Vol. 44:683
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The Ellison court adopted the universal reasonable woman standard. The
court, without discussion, held that the "reasonable woman standard does
not establish a higher level of protection for women than men."
32
The universal reasonable woman standard avoids some of the dangers of
explicitly establishing two different standards. Both men and women have
the right to work in a nonabusive workplace. An employer has no statutory
economic incentive to employ a woman or a man because the employer
must maintain the same nonabusive workplace whether the employer hires
women or men.33
However, the universal reasonable woman standard still does not eliminate
the danger of stereotyping. Jurors will be called on to decide what a
reasonable woman thinks. Some jurors may well rely on stereotypes in
deciding what a reasonable woman thinks. There is the danger that jurors
will draw the inference that a reasonable person is different from a reason-
able woman.
Criticism of the Theoretical Basis for a Reasonable Woman Standard
Another fundamental issue raised by adopting a reasonable woman stan-
dard for allegations involving sexual harassment against women3 4 is its
legitimacy in the traditional Anglo-American legal system. If a reasonable
man or person truly differs from a reasonable woman, then why should
the courts favor the viewpoint of a reasonable woman over a reasonable
man? Moreover, if the courts want to improve opportunities for women,
why choose the viewpoint of a reasonable woman over the subjective
viewpoint of the actual woman?33 The cases and the literature have not
adequately addressed these issues.3 6
author criticizes some feminist "frameworks [which] also reinforce dichotomous-stereotypes-
such as males' association with abstract rationality and females' with empathetic nurturance-
that have restricted opportunities for both sexes."); Aiken, The Male Irresistible Impulse, 12
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (1983-1984).
32. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
33. As a practical matter, an employer may illegally choose to hire men if it believes the
cost of hiring women will exceed the cost of complying with the equal opportunity laws.
34. Under both the Yates and Ellison reasonable victim standards, a woman alleging sexual
harassment will have her claims judged according to the reasonable woman standard.
35. See Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1231-32 (where she argues that the idea of reasona-
bleness should not be retained); Pollack, supra note 2, at 82 ("We can no longer accept men's
versions of the conduct complained of. Women have been told far too long that their feelings
of degradation in the face of what has been passed off as normal behavior are ridiculous.
Certainly, when there is behavior so offensive that a woman is compelled to complain about
it, her perspective must be primary.").
36. This article will only discuss those cases where the court adopted a reasonable victim
standard, but the text is equally true about the other cases. For example, the Lipsett court
discussed the issue of the appropriate standard in one paragraph and never made its standard
explicit. Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988). The Rabidue
majority merely stated that the reasonable person standard was necessary "[t]o accord appro-
priate protection to both plaintiffs and defendants." Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d
611, 620 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1986).
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Ellison, Yates, and the Note subtlely avoid the most difficult theoretical
issue concerning which standard should apply if a reasonable woman and
a reasonable man disagree about the offensiveness of the behavior." The
two courts and the Note author relied on a study which showed that some
men perceived as harmless and innocent many of the actions that some or
most women found offensive. The reasonable woman standard was necessary
to "protect women from the offensive behavior that results from the
divergence of male and female perceptions of appropriate conduct." 38
This argument comes perilously close to turning the definition of what a
reasonable man would think from a moral judgment into an opinion poll.
The study undoubtedly included the opinions of some men who were ill-
informed or prejudiced. The fact that sexual harassment is tolerated in some
workplaces does not make it an acceptable industry standard.39 Moreover,
there is no presumption that external forces, like the market, are successfully
exercising any regulating force on sexual harassment. 40
The Note did not explicitly consider a reasonable person standard, but
the Rabidue dissent, the Yates court, and the Ellison court rejected the
reasonable person standard because it would fall somewhere in between a
reasonable woman and the reasonable man standard. This relied on the
same weak reasoning that because some men may perceive as harmless and
innocent many of the actions that some or most women find offensive, a
reasonable man or person standard must incorporate inappropriate offensive
behavior.
The assumption that reasonable men and reasonable women may disagree
about some conduct may itself be a stereotypical assumption. "Most em-
pirical work on moral reasoning and public values discloses less substantial
gender differences than [certain critical feminist] relational frameworks gen-
erally suggest."
'4'
The difficulty of addressing the fundamental issue of what standard should
control when a reasonable woman and a reasonable man disagree has also
caused the cases and the literature to rely on intuitive balances. The Ellison
court adopted the objective standard of a reasonable woman standard in
order to shield employers from "hypersensitive employees" with no discus-
sion about what constitutes a hypersensitive employee. 42 The Note found
37. If such a situation exists.
38. Note, supra note 5, at 1459.
39. A reasonable per;on standard is not as tied to the status quo as Ehrenreich suggests.
Ehrenreich, supra note 2, at 1178. But see id. at 1234 (where Ehrenreich suggests that a
reasonable person standard is not inevitably tied to the status quo). Courts have invalidated
industry standards as unreasonable in the past. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932).
40. The argument that employers will stop sexual harassment because women will not work
where they are sexually harassed is weak. Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the
Workplace: An Economi: Perspective, U. Cm. L. Rv. 1337, 1355 (1989).
41. Rhode, supra not,. 31, at 625.
42. Id. at 1353. The Radtke reasoning was similar. Radtke v. Everitt, No. 121611, slip op.
at 3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 20, 1991).
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that "a compromise between" the various possible standards was necessary
due to the "equities on the sides of both employee and employer." 43 The
court therefore adopted the objective standard of the reasonable victim
instead of the subjective standard of what the individual woman thought.
44
This is a serious lapse because the views of women are often not considered
reasonable by the very men who are harassing them. Explicit consideration
of the factors used to reach the balance will hopefully help the offending
men to learn and to accept any new standard.
Intuitive balancing based on results presents a further problem for every-
one. It relies on what may be a temporary majority for deciding the difficult
questions of what is offensive and what are the appropriate tradeoffs. It
therefore invites the use of prejudice or inaccurate stereotypes about women
or men.
The argument that title VII requires or supports the adoption of a
reasonable woman standard has serious difficulties. Title VII did not estab-
lish a reasonable woman standard for determining whether behavior is
offensive. It did not even explicitly discuss sexual harassment.43 The argu-
ment that a reasonable woman standard is necessary because one of the
purposes of title VII is to increase opportunities for women is possible, but
it is subject to severe criticism." In particular, the argument cannot explain
why a court should choose a reasonable woman standard over a subjective
woman standard if the latter standard most improves opportunities for
women.
Developing a Method for Evaluating the Various Standards
The cases and the literature have struggled to articulate a basis for a
reasonable victim standard because the theory of sexual harassment has
often been advanced by its proponents as contrary to traditional Anglo-
American jurisprudence. This approach forces judges to argue that a rea-
sonable victim standard is necessary because of results or because of a
statute. The theory of sexual harassment can be, however, easily accom-
modated in the traditional, albeit liberal, Anglo-American theory of justice
proposed by John Rawls. 47 Incorporating the theory of sexual harassment
43. Note, supra note 5, at 1458.
44. Id. at 1459.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
46. See Cox, The Supreme Court, Title VII and "Voluntary" Affirmative Action - A
Critique, 21 IND. L. Rnv. 767 (1988) (criticizing the use of the fact that one of the purposes
of title VII is to increase opportunities for African-Americans, to support race-based remedies).
47. J. RAwLS, A THmoRY oF Justice (1971). Ronald Dworkin provides a brief, informative,
description of this theory:
It imagines a group of men and women who come together to form a social
contract. Thus far it resembles the imaginary congresses of the classical social
theories. The original position [in which all the men and women are in at this
congress] differs, however, from these theories in its description of the parties.
They are men and women with ordinary tastes, talents, ambitions, and convic-
tions, but each is temporarily ignorant of these features of his personality, and
689
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into the Rawls theory allows the courts to develop a method for evaluating
the various standards which is not based solely on intuitive judgments about
fairness.
The Rawls theory has several advantages as a method of choosing between
the various possible standards to determine offensiveness in sexual harass-
ment cases. It is a moral theory based on a theory of individual rights.
4 It
can be viewed as just by both women and men because it relies on unanimous
consent to a social contract in the original position where no one will be
identified according to gender.
49
The Rawls theory also clearly supports outlawing sexual harassment as
sexual discrimination. "[S]exual discrimination presupposes that some hold
a favored positio:n in the social system which they are willing to exploit to
their advantage.'" 0 Sexual harassment falls easily under this definition. Men
who sexually harrass women are exploiting their favored positions in the
workplace as supervisors, as more numerous, or as otherwise more powerful
than the women they are harassing.5 No individual in the original position
would agree to a contract permitting such behavior because the individual
may be a woman.
Finally, the Rawl; theory does not assume that either women or men are
correct about whether the disputed behavior is offensive. Preconceptions
and stereotypes about the way women and men think and behave should
be eliminated.
Some feminists who advocate a reasonable victim standard would reject
using the Rawls theory to evaluate various standards in sexual harassment
cases because hi; theory retains the universalism of traditional Anglo-
American jurisprudence.12 The theory creates a single theoretical individual
must agree upon a contract before his self-awareness returns.
R. DwoRmN, TAKcNO RMss SRmOUSLY 150 (1977).
48. See J. RAwis, supra note 47, at 586 ("to respect persons is to recognize that they
possess an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot
override"); R. DwomaN, supra note 47, at 150-83.
49. See J. RAwis, supra note 47, at 136-37.
Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at
odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own
advantage. Now in order to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind
a veil of ignorance.... It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain
kinds of facts. Fir;t of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position
or social status....
Id.
50. J. RAwxs, supra note 47, at 149.
51. Sexual harassment is "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context
of a relationship of unequal power." C. MAcKINNON, SExuA. HARAssmENT OF WoRaINo
WOMEN; A CASE oF SEx DISCRMNATION 1 (1979). "Sexual harassment is the exploitation of
a powerful position to impose sexual demands or pressures." Note, supra note 5, at 1451. "It
is the recognition that the sexual harassment is an assertion of power by men to control and
subordinate women which is crucial." Pollack, supra note 2, at 83.
52. See Pollack supra note 2, at 53 (general rejection of the traditional Anglo-American
legal concepts of autonoray, privacy, and neutrality).
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by seeking to eliminate all preconceptions, stereotypes, and self-interest from
the individuals in the original position and assuming that the individuals
are rational.53
The claim that women and men view some gender-related behavior dif-
ferently may be, however, part of a claim that history or biology does not
allow the meaningful use of a single theoretical individual in determining
justice. In particular, some feminist philosophers and writers deny that there
is one theoretical individual because of gender.54 The Rawls theory can
adapt to the lesser claim that some people will interpret behavior differently
based on gender outside the original position, but it cannot adapt to the
claim that there is no single theoretical individual type in the original position
because the parties may not agree to a contract.
56
The philosophical validity of the basic challenge to the Rawls theory is
beyond the scope of this article, but there are several good reasons for
using the Rawls theory without resolving the challenge. First, the Rawls
theory is more consistent with traditional Anglo-American legal ideals and
theories. Some may argue that this is a bad reason, but experience has
shown that traditional Anglo-American legal ideals and theories have formed
the basis for greater freedom for everyone. The freedom has come too
slowly and more may be needed, but traditional Anglo-American legal theory
has worked as well or better than any other tradition in the world. Those
who would radically change that tradition should have the burden of showing
that their legal philosophy would be better at achieving a workplace free of
sexual harassment than suitably modified traditional Anglo-American juris-
prudence would be.
57
Second, dividing the world into two groups of people based on an
immutable characteristic is highly suspect.58 It is also highly controversial
even among feminists.59
53. Id. at 142. Rawls also assumes other characteristics about the individuals in the original
position. See id. at 146-50.
54. See H. EISENSTEIN, CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THOuGHT 45-101 (1983) (tracing the de-
velopment of a "woman-centered" analysis by some feminists).
55. See id. at 137 ("Nor... does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars
of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology").
56. See id. at 140-42 (unanimous agreement necessary in the original position).
57. See R. PipEs, TE RussIAN REVOLUTION xxiii (1990) (asking the fundamental question
of when should people destroy old institutions created by trial and error in order to replace
them with institutions created in accordance with theories about an ideal state).
58. The danger of presupposing that there are two fundamentally different viewpoints
because of gender is obvious when one considers that male chauvinists might argue that the
people in the original position could agree to a social contract limiting the right of women to
work because women are suited to stay home and would not mind the limitations on their
freedom. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 120 (1873) (upholding a law denying
women the right to practice law on the grounds of their different personality and different
role as ordained by God).
59. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 830 (1989) (arguing that
EEOC v. Sears shows "how traditionalist judges can use women's culture against women");
see EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. I1. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Third, dividing; the world into two types of people also has another well-
known danger. There is no theoretical stopping point in dividing the world,
because there is no agreement about who is a reasonable woman.w
6
There is no convincing theoretical argument, therefore, for choosing a
more radical theory than the Rawls theory.
Using the Rawls Theory to Evaluate the Possible Standards
The next step is to evaluate the various possible standards using the Rawls
theory. The Rawls theory suggests that a specific and sensitive reasonable
person standard better advances justice than a reasonable woman standard
and better meets the goals of those who advocate a reasonable woman
standard.
Individuals in the original position would reject any standard which
depended upon the sex of the person alleging sexual harassment. An indi-
vidual in the original position would not agree to a reasonable woman
standard because the individual would know that a reasonable woman and
a reasonable man might differ about what is sexual harassment, but the
individual would not know which one was right. 6' Either the reasonable
woman or the reasonable man standard might be incorrect and harmful.
An individual in the original position would also not agree to a standard
based upon past status as a victim. The individual in the original position
would not agree to a contract granting favored status in society to people
solely on the basis of their being past victims because there is no historical
or a priori principle that past victims are always right.62
60. See Rhode, supra note 31, at 624 (author discusses the difficulties of achieving an
"authentic female voice" because of the diversity of views held by women); Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. Ray. 581, 589-90 (criticizing Catherine
MacKinnon's works for "the ways in which the voices of black women ... are suppressed in
the name of commonality"); Dalton, Commentary: Where We Stand: Observations on the
Situation of Feminist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 1, 7 (1987-1988) ("no single
feminist narrative or theory should imagine it can speak univocally for all women").
61. If the individual in the original position knew which standard were correct, then the
individual would agree to it. Many of the articles on sexual harassment assume that the victim,
a woman, is always correct. See, for example, Bratton, The Eye of the Beholder: An
Interdisciplinary Examination of Law and Social Research on Sexual Harassment, 17 N.M.L.
Rav. 91, 99-100 (198"7) ("The previous discussion demonstrates that men's views as to what
constitutes sexual harassment differs [sic] from women's view and limits their acceptance of
what it is, how much of it there is, and who is responsible for its occurrence. Until the
problem is seen from the victim's perspective, institutional reform is not possible."). This
article is skeptical of the claim that, a priori, women are always correct and that men are
always incorrect. Individual variation deeply affects the moral views of everyone. See id. at
100 (Bratton admits that "[i]t is simplistic and misleading to infer from the foregoing that
only women managers cra proscribe sexual harassment or that only women judges can fairly
hear sex discrimination claims. The forces which shape one's beliefs are too complex to be
ascribed soley to gender ..... " but fails to consider the implication of this statement on her
general statements about the views of women and men).
62. Usually victims have a greater claim to being morally correct than the victimizers
because they have not usually victimized anyone. In the United States today, most women can
make this claim because there is no evidence that they want to oppress some or all men
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A reasonable person standard would not give anyone a favored status in
determining whether there was an abusive work environment. The claims
would be evaluated on the merits alone.
Individuals in the original position would also know that a reasonable
person standard might be misinterpreted to incorporate the invalid opinions
of those who commit sexual harassment or who sympathize with the sexual
harassers. Most importantly, they would know that the perception that
reasonable women and reasonable men might disagree about What is sexual
harassment would increase the tendency of judges and juries to use stereo-
types and simplistic reasoning to decide cases. The individuals in the original
position would, therefore, not accept a vague definition of a reasonable
person as in Rabidue. Any reasonable person standard must explicitly and
thoroughly incorporate and consider the important facts about the woman
or man 3 claiming sexual harassment and the work environment in which
he or she worked. 64 This would include recognition that "women are dis-
proportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, '6 5 and other important
experiences of women. A sex-neutral rule does not require ignoring gender
differences."
Will a Specific and Sensitive Reasonable Person Standard Work?
The last objection to using a specific and sensitive reasonable person
standard is that it is not workable. If true, then theoretical arguments about
its superiority to a reasonable woman standard must be set aside. This
article argues that a specific and sensitive reasonable person standard will
work.67
A reasonable person standard would have worked in the highly criticized
Rabidue case if the court of appeals had defined a reasonable person to
because of the injustices they have suffered. But victims are as affected by the injustice they
suffer as the victimizers. Victims and victimizers may both be wrong on any specific issue.
Victims may even victimize once they attain power. T. SowELL, PREFRENTIAL Poucizs: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 152-53 (1990) (listing numerous groups which have been victims
that have also victimized).
63. The importance of men claiming sexual harassment is often overstated. Women are
overwhelmingly the victims of sexual harassment. Bratton, supra note 61, at 93-94 ("However,
it is specious to discuss a world in which women as a group hold such social and economic
power that they are in a position to exploit subordinates who are, as a group, largely male.").
In any event, a reasonable person standard can evaluate whether a workplace is abusive to a
man based on whether the workplace is segregated, whether the man or other men have any
power, whether the sexual conduct was threatening or offensive to people of the same or
different sex, whether it involved a supervisor or peers, and other similar, neutral factors.
64. This responds to the valid criticism that ignoring gender differences by using an abstract
reasonable person standard is unsatisfactory. Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Trans-
formation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAD. L. REv. 1183, 1193 (1989).
65. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
66. "What is needed is not a gender-neutral rule but one that avoids the traditional
shorthand of addressing gender by reference to sex." Williams, supra note 59, at 839.
67. Pollack found the result acceptable in Lipsett which used a reasonable person standard.
Pollack, supra note 2, at 84.
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include the specific facts of Vivienne Rabidue's situation. She may have
been the first person of her sex to enter a previously segregated workplace.6
Her job required her to exercise authority over members of the opposite
sex. When 'she attempted to exercise her authority, a person of the favored
sex challenged her and used extremely vulgar and demeaning language about
her personally. In addition, management tolerated extremely vulgar and
demeaning language about females and posters of nude females. 69
Reasonable persons of either sex would have great difficulty performing
their job under such circumstances. They would feel frustrated. They would
feel angry at the unfairness. They would feel threatened because they could
not perform their job. They would be hurt. In short, the abusive working
environment would seriously affect their psychological well-being.
Conclusion
The reasonable victim standard is an advance over the mechanical appli-
cation of a reasonable person standard in sexual harassment cases involving
an abusive work environment, but it too may result in the use of stereotypes
about women and men. A reasonable person standard which explicitly and
thoroughly addresses the reality of sexual harassment will best open oppor-
tunities for women and create a new, single workplace norm. A reasonable
person standard also allows the courts to stay closer to the Anglo-American
tradition of universalism.
68. The Rabidue cdiss.-nt claimed she was the only salaried woman management employee.
Id. at 623 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The district court and majority
did not agree or disagree with this statement, but they did not mention any other salaried
women management employees. The failure to make a finding on this issue should be a
reversible error.
69. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1986).
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